Executive Summary
Identity has become a primary security boundary for most organizations, reducing the ability to solely trust other boundaries once associated with corporate networks. Users authenticate to cloud services using enterprise identities that provide access to collaboration platforms, business applications and sensitive data. With the adoption of software-as-a-service (SaaS) on the rise, people are shifting to platforms for communication and collaboration.
Threat actors have adapted to this shift. In addition to typical email-based phishing, attackers increasingly misuse trusted collaboration platforms to conduct identity phishing, impersonation, credential theft, malware delivery and social engineering. Over the last 12 months, our endpoint alerts of malicious activity associated with collaboration tools have more than quadrupled, as Figure 1 shows. This activity could involve compromised accounts, external federated organizations, guest accounts or trusted third-party relationships. In each case, the attackers seek to exploit the trust that people place in enterprise communication platforms.
This changes the role that collaboration platforms play within enterprise security. They are not just productivity applications, they have become part of the enterprise attack surface. Unit 42 researchers found that 99% of the alerts generated related to chat phishing operations, indicating that attackers often gain access to these environments through targeted phishing operations. After a successful compromise, attackers can then communicate using the identity and privileges of the compromised user. This allows malicious activity to appear as normal collaboration activity.
Security controls typically remain focused on email and authentication events, often providing limited visibility into activity occurring within authenticated collaboration sessions.
We examine how threat actors leverage trusted communication channels and review identity abuse techniques. We also provide practical recommendations for detecting and defending against identity-focused attacks targeting enterprise collaboration platforms.
Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed above through the following products and services:
- Cortex XDR and XSIAM
- Idira Endpoint Privilege Manager (EPM)
- Idira Secrets Manager
- Idira Privileged Access Management (PAM)
- Idira Secure Infrastructure Access (SIA)
- Idira Secure Cloud Access (SCA)
If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team.
| Related Unit 42 Topics | Phishing, Identity, Credential Theft |
Understanding Trusted Communication Channels
Enterprise collaboration platforms have become integral to business operations. Employees use these platforms to exchange messages, share files, coordinate projects and communicate with colleagues, customers and business partners. Organizations typically connect collaboration platform access to their identity provider, and people rely on these platforms for trusted, authenticated communication.
Unlike email, collaboration platforms enable real-time conversations and support features such as external federation, guest access, shared workspaces and third-party integrations. These capabilities improve productivity but also create opportunities for misuse. Attackers can exploit compromised accounts, trusted business relationships or authorized external access to interact with victims through legitimate communication channels. Figure 2 shows common pathways for attackers to compromise identities in enterprise and cloud environments.
When a collaboration account is compromised, attackers inherit the identity context of that user, including their permissions, relationships and ongoing conversations. Requests that might appear suspicious in an email can appear routine when delivered through an authenticated collaboration platform. This reduces a target’s suspicion and increases the effectiveness of identity phishing, impersonation, credential theft and social engineering.
As organizations adopt more SaaS collaboration platforms, they should treat these environments as part of the identity attack surface. Protecting them requires both strong authentication, and visibility into how trusted identities and communication channels are used after authentication.
| Intrusion Technique | Campaign Misuse Pattern |
| Initial access: Phishing (T1566) | Identity phishing through external collaboration channels |
| Stealth: Impersonation (T1684.001) | Impersonation through legitimate platform notifications, hosted content and direct messages |
| Persistence: Modify Authentication Process (T1556) | MFA removal and privileged credential exfiltration through a native Slack webhook integration |
|
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 |
dataset=xdr_data |filter _time>="2026-07-08T00:00:00Z"and_time<"2026-07-09T00:00:00Z" |filter( // Look for Slack/Teams in the causality chain spawning shells (lowercase(causality_actor_process_image_name)contains"slack"or lowercase(causality_actor_process_image_name)contains"teams"or lowercase(actor_process_image_name)contains"slack"or lowercase(actor_process_image_name)contains"teams") and (lowercase(actor_process_image_name)in("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","bash","sh","zsh")or lowercase(action_process_image_name)in("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","bash","sh","zsh")) ) |fields _time,actor_process_command_line, action_process_image_command_line, causality_actor_process_command_line, actor_process_image_name, action_process_image_name, causality_actor_process_image_name, actor_process_image_sha256, action_process_image_sha256, causality_actor_process_image_sha256, action_file_path,actor_causality_id, causality_actor_process_causality_id, dst_actor_remote_ip,dst_action_external_hostname, action_remote_ip,action_external_hostname |sort asc _time |