Executive Summary
To assess the impact of AI-enabled malware, we collected and analyzed over 400 malware samples that integrate AI in some capacity, from brand impersonation and large language model (LLM)-generated code to agentic execution loops. Our central finding was that the AI malware space is currently overwhelmingly composed of proof-of-concept code, security validation testing and researcher submissions that have never reached a production environment.
Of the 405 samples in our dataset, only 12 appeared in our telemetry on Cortex XDR-protected endpoints, and a small subset was forwarded through Next-Generation Firewalls to WildFire for analysis. Palo Alto Networks products detected and blocked every sample that attempted to reach a customer environment.
These numbers tell a story that sits between two poles in the current discourse. AI-enabled malware is real. However, the volume of genuine operational activity remains a fraction of what public sample repositories suggest. Approximately 97% of the samples we examined exist only in sandboxes and on VirusTotal.
For defenders, the practical takeaway is straightforward. Existing behavioral detection, cloud-based sandboxing and endpoint analytics catch these threats using the same mechanisms that stop conventional malware. The AI component does not evade detection. It changes how the code is authored, not how it executes.
Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected against the threats discussed in this article through the following products and services, which detected these AI-enabled malware threats out of the box:
If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team.
| Related Unit 42 Topics | LLM, Agentic AI, Malware |
The Dataset
Our starting dataset consisted of 405 unique SHA-256 hashes collected from WildFire analysis reports, VirusTotal Intelligence and published open-source intelligence (OSINT) research.
The collection criteria were broad. We included any sample where AI integration was either a functional component of the malware, a feature of its delivery mechanism or part of its branding. This intentionally inclusive approach captured everything from LLM-powered ransomware agents to cryptocurrency miners that simply used “ChatGPT” in their filename.
We queried this dataset across multiple telemetry sources to measure real-world prevalence:
- Endpoint presence: Cortex XDR agent telemetry from non-test tenants (December 2024–June 2025)
- Network visibility: WildFire session data from samples forwarded by Next-Generation Firewalls and Cortex XDR agents (June 2024–June 2025)
- Alert generation: Cortex XDR alert records for samples that triggered detection logic on endpoints
- Sandbox verdicts: WildFire analysis results with malware classification
Table 1 summarizes the results of this dataset.
| Telemetry Source | Samples Queried | Samples Discovered | Prevalence in Production |
| Cortex XDR endpoints | 405 | 12 | 3.0% |
| WildFire sessions | 405 | ~15–20 unique hashes | ~4% |
| Cortex XDR alerts generated | 12 | 12 | 100% |
Table 1. Telemetry coverage across the AI malware dataset.
The disparity between the 405-sample dataset and the 12 samples observed in production environments is the most important number in this analysis. Approximately 97% of AI-enabled malware samples exist only in research repositories, sandbox environments and security validation platforms. We found no evidence that they reached a customer endpoint or traversed a customer firewall.
The following sections examine the characteristics of the dataset.
What the Other 97% Looks Like
The samples that never appeared in production telemetry fall into three categories:
| SHA256 hash | Family |
| 1619bcad3785be31ac2fdee0ab91392d08d9392032246e42673c3cb8964d4cb7 | Trojanized application (RecipeLister) |
| 5226ea8e0f516565ba825a1bbed10020982c16414750237068b602c5b4ac6abd | FunkSec ransomware |
| dcf536edd67a98868759f4e72bcbd1f4404c70048a2a3257e77d8af06cb036ac | FunkSec ransomware |
| 66dbf939c00b09d8d22c692864b68c4a602e7a59c4b925b2e2bef57b1ad047bd | FunkSec ransomware |
| c233aec7917cf34294c19dd60ff79a6e0fac5ed6f0cb57af98013c08201a7a1c | FunkSec ransomware |
| e622f3b743c7fc0a011b07a2e656aa2b5e50a4876721bcf1f405d582ca4cda22 | FunkSec ransomware |
| b1ef7b267d887e34bf0242a94b38e7dc9fd5e6f8b2c5c440ce4ec98cc74642fb | FunkSec ransomware |
| 20ed21bfdb7aa970b12e7368eba8e26a711752f1cc5416b6fd6629d0e2a44e5d | FunkSec ransomware |
| dd15ce869aa79884753e3baad19b0437075202be86268b84f3ec2303e1ecd966 | FunkSec ransomware |
| c398b3e06ef860670b9597daed85632834fa961aea87164b8ba8bb2f094a14ef | COM hijacking DLL |
| bb932056cae8940742e50b4f2b994a802e703f7bc235e7dd647d085ae2b2baf7 | Oyster backdoor/CleanBoost |
| 4fb58687a364c3f6d6f7e0ca03654f9dec0f8832a499d61d40b0d424db1b1b14 | Rhadamanthys stealer |